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Abstract 
This paper discusses the foreign investment protection regime and policy of Israel, analyzes the central 
features of its bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and argues that time has come to use these treaties as 
a tool to attract foreign investment to the country, in particular in the energy sector. It shows that until 
now, BITs have been concluded mainly with developing and transition-economy countries and as a 
means to protect Israeli investors in those countries. This policy has been based on the perception that 
only developing countries with politically unstable regimes and corrupt or non-independent judiciaries 
need such treaties, while Israel can rely on its good reputation of being a democratic state, based on the 
rule of law, with a free-market economy and a well-reputed judiciary to attract FDI. The paper argues 
that not only is this viewpoint incompatible with current trends in International Investment Law where 
more and more BITs are concluded between developed countries, it must also be revised on the 
background of what has occurred in Israel over the last few years in the energy sector. The paper 
describes the long saga of the regulatory changes in relation to the natural gas sector, ever since huge 
offshore gas fields were discovered, including the Supreme Court’s rulings on the changes of the tax 
regime and on the stabilization clause, and analyses its impact on the investment climate. The paper 
presents original data on this impact and suggests policy recommendations based on the analysis of the 
situation. 
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Introduction* 
As I will show in this article, Israel has traditionally not seen international investment treaties as a means 
to attract foreign investment. The perception among the officials in charge of the field in Israel’s 
Ministry of Finance has been that only developing countries with politically unstable regimes and 
corrupt or non-independent judiciaries need such treaties as a means to provide steadfast protection 
against arbitrary governmental actions. Since Israel has a good reputation of being a democratic state, 
based on the rule of law, with a free-market economy and a well-reputed judiciary with a proven record 
of independence, they believe that foreign investors can feel confident that their investments will not be 
arbitrarily harmed by the government. And if harm should befall them, they can rest assured that they 
will be duly compensated. In fact, the policy makers feared that to sign bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) with developed countries might send a bad signal to the international markets and cause investors 
to view Israel as an unstable developing economy.  
In this article, I will argue that not only is this viewpoint mistaken and incompatible with current trends 
in International Investment Law where more and more BITs are concluded between developed countries, 
it can also not be maintained any longer given what has occurred in Israel over the last few years in the 
energy sector. There are reasons for concern that the Via Dolorosa that a major foreign investor has been 
subjected to, with endless recurring changes of the rules and policies that apply to one of the largest 
single foreign investments in the country’s history, has seriously harmed its reputation and almost 
brought to a halt foreign investment in energy exploration. In view of these developments, it is 
imperative to reassess the country’s investment policies. In particular, one should reconsider the use of 
international investment treaties as a means to restore the trust of potential foreign investors in the energy 
sector, so that oil and natural gas exploration in Israel can be resumed at an optimal level.  
The article will proceed as follows: Section 2 will describe Israel’s existing bilateral investment treaties 
and analyze briefly their provisions and the rationales behind them. Section 3 will proceed to describe 
the ongoing saga of the attempt to regulate the development of the rich natural gas fields discovered in 
Israel’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the many regulatory setbacks experienced by the US company 
Noble Energy and the other investors in the natural gas sector, including the recent ruling by the Israel 
Supreme Court that struck down the stabilization clause of the gas framework. In Section 4, I will argue 
for a reassessment of Israel’s foreign investment policies based on these and other recent developments. 
Israel’s foreign investment protection regime: A brief survey of the relevant 
international treaties 
Israel’s Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Israel is a party to around forty BITs, about 35 of which are in full force. The rest of them have either 
been terminated or have not yet been ratified. Because of incomplete available information and 
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of Conciliators and Arbitrators. I would like to thank my doctoral student Yael Lande and my research assistant Aviram 
Shlanger, for their help with this article. Thanks are also due to Miri Ben Tulila of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics and 
Dina Levant from the Ministry of Energy for providing me with important information. Special thanks go to my colleagues 
and friends Yoram Haftel, Guy Harpaz, Sivan Shlomo-Agon, Rachel Frid-De Vries and Ofer Oberlander for their helpful 
comments on a previous draft of this article, which saved me from many errors. All of the remaining ones are my own.  
I would also like to thank the organizers and participants of the Workshop on the Nature and Implications of the Global 
Investment Regime, held at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem on May 25-26, 2016, for their valuable comments on a 
previous version of this paper. 
Arie Reich 
2 Department of Law Working Papers 
conflicting accounts about which BITs are in force, the present author has compiled a list of Israel’s 
current BITs (including one free trade agreement with an investment protection chapter) with details 
about their date of signature, date of entry into force, amendments and current legal status. The list is 
attached as Annex 1 to this paper. 
Almost all of these forty treaties were concluded with developing countries or with Eastern European 
countries in transition. Only two of the BITs are with developed countries, namely with Germany and 
France. It is however doubtful whether the BIT with France, concluded in 1983, is still in force,1 and 
the BIT with Germany, concluded in 1976, is a quite old and not very sophisticated agreement, and it 
does not include an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (“ISDS”) clause.2 Its importance is also very 
limited, because it only applies to German investments in Israel if such investments have been “admitted 
by Israel by a document of admission”,3 and apparently very few, if any, such investments have been 
made.4 
The vast majority of the states on the list are from Eastern Europe (21), some of which are today EU 
member states (12). Several others are in the Eurasia region (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and some in the Far East (China, India, Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar and 
Thailand). Four are in Latin America (Argentina, El Salvador, Guatemala and Uruguay) and only three 
in Africa (Congo, Ethiopia and South Africa).  
Israel is not a party to any regional or plurilateral investment treaty (such as the Energy Charter Treaty), 
and none of its current Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) that are in force include investment protection 
chapters. The only exception to date is the FTA with Colombia, signed in 2013 but not yet ratified by 
Colombia.5 This FTA includes a detailed chapter on reciprocal investment protection (Chapter 10), 
including an ISDS mechanism. In addition, in some of the new FTAs being negotiated now, especially 
with Asian countries, an investment chapter is contemplated.6  
Israel’s policy in relation to international investment treaties 
The fact that almost none of the states on the list are from developed, traditionally capital-exporting 
countries, can teach us a few things about Israel’s global investment policy. First, it means that the Israeli 
Government views BITs primarily as a tool to protect Israeli investments abroad and not as a tool to 
                                                     
1 According to information obtained from Israel’s Ministry of Finance, the status of the treaty is in dispute between the parties: 
Israel is of the opinion that it expired in 1995, ten years after its entry into force, and only applied for another 20 years to 
investments made prior to 1995 (in accordance with Article 12 of the Agreement). Hence, in 2015, the treaty expired 
completely. France, however, maintains that it is still in force. It was therefore included in the list of the bilateral investment 
agreements with third countries notified by EU Member States as agreements in force that they wish to maintain. See OJ 
C 149, 27.4.2016, p. 1–124. In the UNCTAD database, it is also designated as “in force”.  
2 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments (24.6.1976), Article 10.  
3 Ibid., Article 1(c)(ii) which provides that the said term “investment” shall refer: “in respect of investments in the territory of 
the State of Israel, to all investments admitted by Israel by a document of admission.” The meaning of such a document is 
elaborated in the Protocol to the agreement, which in Ad Article 1(a), provides: “The expression 'document of admission' 
shall mean a document by which the State of Israel admits into its territory for the purposes of the Treaty an investment 
by a national or company of the Federal Republic of Germany.” (emphasis added – A.R.). In other words, the Israeli 
authorities must have issued such a document, which in effect acknowledges that the investment will be subject to the BIT, 
in order for the BIT to apply to it. In contrast, for Israeli investments in Germany, there is no such formal requirement. 
Rather, the definition is: “in respect of investments in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, to all investments 
made in accordance with its legislation”.  
4 Israeli officials that I spoke to were not aware of any such “document of admission” ever issued. 
5 Free Trade Agreement between the State of Israel and the Republic of Colombia, signed 30.9.2013. Available here: 
http://www.mof.gov.il/chiefecon/internationalconnections/doclib1/colombia.pdf .  
6 Information obtained from Israel’s Ministry of Economy. 
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attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to Israel. FDI in Israel comes primarily from developed 
countries, such as the United States, Canada and Western Europe. For instance, in 2012-2014, the most 
important source was the United States, which accounted for about 24% of total FDI.7 Europe accounted 
for about 21%. If the Israeli Government had thought that BITs are needed in order to boost FDI from 
those countries, one would expect it to have made efforts to conclude BITs with them. Instead, the 
Government’s efforts have to date been almost exclusively directed towards developing countries, and 
in particular former members of the Communist Bloc, which have been very attractive to Israeli 
investors since the fall of the Iron Curtain,8 and countries in Asia,9 none of which have been major 
sources for investments in Israel.10 As recounted by one of the officials in charge of Israeli BITs in 1999: 
“We are mainly interested in countries that are potential targets for Israeli exports and investments, such 
as Eastern Europe, China, India, Korea, with which we already have agreements, Latin America, Russia, 
Singapore, Brazil, Chile and other with which we intend to sign agreements in the near future.”11 
One must therefore ask oneself why the Government thinks that BITs are not required in order to attract 
FDI to Israel. It would seem that the policy makers are of the opinion that Israel’s reputation as a 
democratic state based on the rule of law, with an independent judiciary and strong protection of private 
property, makes BITs unnecessary12 (although they still believe investment incentives are required13). 
Unlike the situation in politically unstable regimes, or in countries with a corrupt or non-independent 
judiciary, where BITs are required in order to provide a steadfast protection against arbitrary 
governmental actions, none of the kind is required in Israel, they reason.14 They see that foreign 
investment is flowing in abundance from the West without the international guarantees provided by 
BITs, and it must be because foreign investors know that in Israel their investments will not be subject 
to expropriation or other arbitrary government measures, or at least if they are, there will be full 
compensation. In fact, interviews with officials in charge of this field in the Ministry of Finance,15 as 
well as a published article by one of them,16 reveal that the perception among them is that to sign BITs 
with developed countries might send a bad signal to international markets that could hurt Israel’s credit 
                                                     
7 Based on figures published by Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, “Foreign Direct Investment in Israel and Direct Investment 
Abroad. By Industries and Countries, 2012-2014” (Publication 104/2016; 14 April 2016). The average of investment 
transactions for 2012-2014 from the whole world was $9.2 billion, and from the U.S.A. it was $2.2 billion. FDI from 
Europe (including Eastern Europe) amounted to $1.9 billion.  
8 For instance, in 2014, Israelis invested over $1.5 billion in European former Communist countries (ibid.).  
9 In 2014, total Israeli investment in Asia and Oceania amounted to $5.8 billion. If we subtract the shares of Australia and Japan 
(developed countries), the amount is $3.3 billion.  
10 Only lately, China has become a growing source for foreign investment in Israel, but that was not the case over twenty years 
ago when the BIT with China was signed.  
11 Oded Boneh, “Foreign Investment Protection Agreements and the Israeli Context”, 26 Israeli Tax Quarterly Vol. 104, 45 
(1999) (Hebrew). One should mention that many of those intentions never materialized: Israel still has no BITs with Russia, 
Singapore, Brazil or Chile and only three more BITs have been signed with other Latin American countries since the article 
was published: Colombia, El Salvador and Guatemala. 
12 Boneh, supra note 16, p. 57. 
13 Incentives for foreign investors are governed mainly by the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment, enacted in 
1959, and include both tax breaks and capital grants. For a discussion of the existing incentives, see Avi Nov, “Investment 
Incentives in Israel, 51 Tax Notes International No. 5, 443 (2008).  
14 A similar reasoning was expressed by Justice Rubinstein of the Israeli Supreme Court in his judgment in relation to the 
stabilization clause of the Natural Gas Framework, that will be discussed below (see section 4.7 The Supreme Court Strikes 
Down the Framework). It should be mentioned, that before his appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Rubinstein served 
in several government positions, including as the Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as the Attorney 
General of Israel and as such must have been familiar with the considerations that guide the policies in this field. 
15 As reflected in Efraim (Efi) Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral Agreement 
and the Israeli Case (A Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan Law School, 2008), Chapter 3 (see footnotes 18 and 
20).  
16 Boneh, supra note 16, p. 57. 
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rating by international agencies and its image as a developed and stable country.17 According to 
Chalamish, Israel even rejected several attempts by the Swiss Government to initiate negotiations on a 
bilateral investment treaty as a prerequisite for a double taxation treaty between the two countries, 
because Israel did not want to signal that it is open to negotiate BITs with developed countries.18 Bad 
experience with past negotiations with developed countries has also had an impact. In such negotiations, 
Israel was asked to give up its right to maintain regulatory flexibility in the field of foreign currency 
control and it was felt that this may harm state sovereignty in case of emergency situations.19 Finally, 
one could speculate that the desire to protect the state from international law suits has also played a role. 
If most of the FDI comes from (developed) countries with which there are no BITs, it means that the 
risk of an ICSID (or other international tribunal) claim by disgruntled foreign investors is significantly 
reduced. 
Main features of existing BITs 
Israel’s existing BITs extend protection to foreign investments and investors, as defined in the respective 
treaty, originating from the parties to the treaty. The BIT’s are centered on the post-establishment phase, 
and generally do not relate to the pre-establishment phase. In other words, Israel has not committed itself 
to permit free and equal entry to foreign investors, although, in practice, restrictions on entry are rare. 
While most of the treaties include commitments to “encourage and create favorable conditions for 
investments by investors of the other Contracting Party” as well as a commitment to “admit such 
investments”,20 this last commitment is subject to the Party’s legislation. Thus, to the extent that existing 
legislation restricts entry, the treaty does not overcome such a restriction. 
The substantive protections extended to foreign investors by Israel’s BITs include most of the regular 
ambit: Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET), National Treatment, Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
Treatment, Full Protection and Security, Compensation in case of Direct or Indirect Expropriation and 
Right of Repatriation, although there are differences in formulations that need to be noted.  
The FET provision is not limited to the minimum standards of Customary International Law,21 as in the 
2004 US Model BIT.22 The same applies to the Full Protection and Security provisions. These provisions 
therefore provide an effective source of protection against substandard treatment by host governments. 
However, in Israel’s Model BIT, adopted in 2003, and in BITs concluded since then, the FET obligation 
has an addition to it that may be restrictive: “in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement”.23 
The precise meaning and significance of this addition is unclear and the government did not provide any 
                                                     
17 Boneh, supra note 16, p. 57. See also Chalamish, supra note 15, p. 72.  
18 Chalamish, supra note 15, in footnote 23. 
19 Boneh, supra note 16, p. 58. These were concerns that were valid at the time. The foreign currency control regime was 
repealed in 2003 and since then there are no more restrictions on the movement of foreign currency. 
20 See for example Article 2.1 of the Israel-Azerbaijan BIT of 2007, as well as Article 2.1 of the Israel-Slovakia BIT of 1999. 
21 See for instance Article 2.2 of the Israel-Slovakia BIT (1999) which provides: “Investments made by investors of each 
Contracting Party shall be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy full protection and security in the territory 
of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of investors of the other 
Contracting Party.” 
22 See Article 5 in the United States Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2004, available here: http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/117601.pdf  
23 See Article 2.2 of Israel’s Model Bilateral Investment Treaty of 2003, available here: http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il 
/financeisrael/Docs/En/InternationalAgreements/IPa.pdf . This language is to be found also in the BITs with the following 
countries: Azerbaijan (2007), Guatemala (2006), Serbia and Montenegro (2004), Ethiopia (2003), Mongolia (2003). This 
language does not appear in BITs from before 2003. 
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explanations to the change.24 On the one hand, it is untenable that because of this addition, the content 
of the FET obligation is limited to the protection provided by other provisions of the BIT. That cannot 
be the correct interpretation, because it would mean that the FET provision is redundant and does not 
add anything to the already existing provisions. It would go against the principle of effectiveness in 
treaty interpretation.25 On the other hand, that very same principle also mandates that we give some 
meaning to these added words (“in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement”). It would seem 
to me that this addition should be read on the backdrop of the debate that has erupted over the last few 
years on whether the FET treatment guaranteed by BITs is identical to the FET standard guaranteed by 
Customary International Law (which is a quite minimal standard, especially if we interpret it according 
to the 1926 Neer Case),26 or whether it represents a higher, treaty-based, standard. Most investment 
arbitration tribunals have ruled in accordance with the latter approach, which entails a higher level of 
protection for foreign investors.27 Unlike the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the 
US Model BIT, where the standard is explicitly linked to “international law” and comes under the 
heading “minimum standard of treatment”,28 Israel’s Model BIT and the BITs signed since 2003 link 
the FET treatment to “this Agreement”. I would submit, therefore, that the intention is to clarify that the 
standard is not the minimum one ensured by Customary International Law, but rather a higher treaty-
based standard. According to this proposed interpretation, we give meaning and significance both to the 
FET provision as a whole, saving it from redundancy, as well as to the added words “in accordance with 
the provisions of this Agreement”. 
It should be noted that the 2003 Model BIT, and the BITs signed since 2003, also include a limitation 
on the application of the MFN obligation to the effect that it does not apply to benefits resulting from 
BITs signed before 2003. Hence, the limitation arising from the additional wording in the FET provision 
discussed above cannot be circumvented by relying on the MFN provision. On the other hand, while 
there is no FET provision in the Israel-Kazakhstan BIT of 1995, the MFN provision in this BIT is not 
restricted, so that an FET obligation can be “imported” from other treaties.29 
Most of Israel’s BITs do not include an umbrella clause, i.e., a provision where the host state undertakes 
– as a matter of public international law – to observe contractual obligations entered towards the foreign 
investor. Such provisions are found only in eight out of Israel’s BITs, namely those with Belarus (2000), 
Bulgaria (1993), Latvia (1994), Lithuania (1994), Slovakia (1999), Turkey (1996), Turkmenistan (1995) 
and Ukraine (1994).  
All of Israel’s BITs, except for the one with Germany (1976), include provisions on binding dispute 
settlement procedures between the foreign investor and the host state (ISDS). In addition, there are 
provisions for binding inter-state dispute resolution. Most of the BITs do not restrict the types of disputes 
that are subject to ISDS.30 Some of them talk about “dispute on an investment”,31 which would seem to 
exclude other types of disputes. Two BITs limit the application of the dispute settlement mechanism to 
                                                     
24 In the official brief published on the new Model BIT, where changes are explained, this change is not even mentioned. See 
State of Israel, Ministry of Finance, International Affairs Department, Israel’s BIT model, available here: 
http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/financeisrael/Docs/En/InternationalAgreements/IPb.pdf . 
25 See for example H. Lauterpact, K.C, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretations of 
Treaties, 26 Brit. Y.B. int'l.   
26 United Nations, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, 1926, IV, pp. 60ff. 
27 See e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Award on the Merits Phase 2, award of April 10, 2001; CME Czech Republic B.V. 
v. The Czech Republic, partial award of September 13, 2001; MTD Equity v. Chile award of May 25, 2004. 
28 See NAFTA, Article 1105.1. 
29 For Kazakhstan investors in Israel, almost any treaty could be used as a source for the FET obligation. For Israeli investors 
in Kazakhstan, one could use for example the 2014 Kazakhstan-Japan BIT, Article 5.1. Available here: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3283 .  
30 For instance, the BITs with Poland, Slovakia, Mongolia, Guatemala, Lithuania, Latvia, Turkmenistan and Georgia. 
31 For instance, the BITs with Cyprus, Argentina, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Slovakia and Moldova.  
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certain defined disputes only, and not others. The most restrictive one is the BIT with China (1995), 
which limits such arbitration to “the amount of compensation in the case of expropriation”.32 Hence, if 
there is a dispute about any of the other substantive obligations under the BIT, including the question of 
whether an expropriation, as defined in the Treaty, has occurred, a foreign investor will probably not be 
able to bring the dispute to binding arbitration, unless the host state consents.33 A less drastic limitation 
is found in the BIT with Bulgaria (1993) where ISDS claims between the investor and the host-state can 
only be brought in relation to disputes under Article 4 (Compensation for Losses), Article 5 
(Expropriation), Article 6 (Repatriation of Investment and Returns) and Article 11 (Application of Other 
Rules).34 Hence, violations of the FET (Article 2), MFN and National Treatment (Article 3) obligations 
cannot be enforced through ISDS.35  
All of the BITs provide that prior to binding arbitration, the investor and the host state shall try to settle 
their differences amicably, some as a binding requirement and others “as far as possible”. Most of them 
set a minimum time period for such efforts that range from three months (most common)36 to six 
months,37 and in one case even 18 months.38 
As for the venues for arbitration procedures, many of the BITs refer only to the International Center for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).39 Others provide for ICSID or ad-hoc arbitration, some 
to domestic courts of the host state or ICSID,40 and some provide a choice from five alternatives: a 
domestic court of the host state, conciliation, ICSID, Additional Facility Rules of ICSID, and ad hoc 
arbitration under UNCITRAL rules.41 The BIT with Poland refers only to ad hoc arbitration42 and the 
                                                     
32 Article 8.1 of the Israel-China BIT, available here: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3371 . This 
is a limitation quite common in China’s BITs. See for instance Article XII of the China-Australia BIT of 1988, available 
here: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/148 . 
33 Such investor could, however, try to use the Most-Favored-Nation clause of this BIT (found in Article 3) in order to obtain 
a broader jurisdiction of an arbitration tribunal. For instance, a Chinese investor in Israel could rely on most of Israel’s 
other BITs which have general investor-state dispute resolution mechanisms not limited to the amount of compensation for 
expropriation, as in the China-Israel BIT. An Israeli investor in China could try to rely on the China-Germany BIT of 2003, 
which also includes an unlimited investor-state dispute resolution mechanism (Article 9). This raises the question of 
whether an MFN clause could be used to import procedural rights, and in particular to create jurisdiction, where such 
jurisdiction would otherwise not exist. This is a question that has been much disputed in both case law and the academic 
literature. One case where this was allowed is RosInvestCo UK Ltd v Russia (SCC Case No V 079/2005, Award, 12 
September 2010). But most tribunals have ruled against the expansion of jurisdiction ratione materiae based on an MFN 
clause. See for example Salini Construttori SpA and Italstrade SpA v Jordan (ICSID Case No ARB/02/13, Award, 31 
January 2006); Vladimir Berschander and Moïse Berschander v Russia (SCC Case No 080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006), 
and Telenor Mobile Communications AS v Hungary (ICSID Case No ARB/04/15, Award, 13 September 2006) all of which 
deal with cases which are very similar to the case at hand. 
34 Article 8.2 of the Israel-Bulgaria BIT (1993). Available here: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/ 
TreatyFile/535  
35 Again, unless an investor is successful in convincing a tribunal that the MFN provision of the BIT can be invoked to broaden 
jurisdiction. See discussion in footnote 33 above. 
36 For instance, this is the time period in the BITs with Slovenia, Uzbekistan, Lithuania, Latvia, Turkmenistan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Turkey and Estonia.   
37 For instance, this is the time period in the BITs with India, Uruguay, Azerbaijan, Serbia, Montenegro, Mongolia, Guatemala, 
Belarus, Argentina and Ethiopia. The 2003 Model BIT also provides for a six months negotiation period. 
38 This was provided in the BIT with Hungary that was terminated in 2007. 
39 For instance the BITs with Slovenia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, China, Hungary, Albania, Armenia, Korea, Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Georgia and Turkmenistan.  
40 The BITs with Romania and Turkey. 
41 For instance, the BITs with Azerbaijan, Thailand, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Ethiopia, Argentina and Serbia. 
42 Probably because Poland was not an ICSID party when the BIT was signed. 
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BIT with Cyprus offers, in addition to domestic courts, ICSID or ad hoc arbitration, also ICC 
arbitration.43 The choice of the venue is at the option of the investor. 
The ongoing saga of natural gas regulation in Israel and its impact on the investment 
climate 
The discovery of natural gas 
After decades of Israel being almost exclusively dependent on imported energy, and five years after 
commencement of domestic natural gas production from the Mari-B project in 2004, in 2009-2010, 
private explorers finally found significant sources of energy that not only can supply a large share of the 
State’s own needs, but also turn it into a future exporter of energy. This transformation occurred as a 
result of the finding of several gas fields within Israel's offshore Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Two of the main fields – Tamar, estimated to hold 280 BCM (billion cubic meters) 
discovered in 2009 (and 310 BCM with “Tamar South-West” that was discovered later), and Leviathan 
621 BCM,44 discovered in 2010 – were the biggest deep-water natural gas finds in the world for those 
years.45 These discoveries were followed by the Tanin gas field in 2012, with 22 BCM, and Karish in 
2013, with 32 BCM. To get an idea of the magnitude of these discoveries, we should mention that 
Israel’s total consumption of natural gas in 2015 was around 8.4 BCM.46 There are high chances that 
more gas fields and even exploitable oil deposits will be found within Israel's EEZ.47 
Most of the license holders for these gas fields are Israeli companies, the largest of which is the Delek 
Group controlled by the Israeli tycoon Yitzhak Tshuva. But there is also one large foreign investor and 
explorer – Noble Energy Inc. – a U.S. oil and natural gas exploration and production company, which 
holds about 35% of the Tamar field, 40% of the Leviathan field, and 47% of the Tanin-Karish fields.48 
Noble entered the Israeli market in 2006. 
                                                     
43 Article 8 of the Israel-Cyprus BIT. 
44 621 BCM is the estimate of Noble Energy, backed up by a survey of SGS S.A. Delek also supports this figure, based on a 
survey by the international consulting firm NSAI, publicly presented pursuant to SEC regulations. Figures represent Best 
Estimates (2C or 2P) This is also the estimate that was the basis for the Gas Framework and was quoted by the Supreme 
Court in its judgment in this matter. Lately, a more modest estimate of 500 BCM has been published and espoused by 
Israel’s Ministry of Energy as the basis for the export quota (Lior Gutman, “The Gas Companies Proposed Arbitration on 
the Volume of Leviathan”, Calcalist 5.6.16, p. 3 (Hebrew)). Noble and Delek maintain that their estimate is the correct one. 
45 Simon Henderson, "Natural Gas Export Options for Israel and Cyprus", Mediterranean Paper Series, Sept. 2013, German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, available: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/ 
opeds/Henderson20130901-NaturalGasExportOptions.pdf  
46 Figure based on Annual Budget Proposal for years 2017-2018, Ministry of National Infrastructure, Energy & Water, and 
Explanations (Hebrew), p. 23, available here: http://mof.gov.il/BudgetSite/statebudget/budget2017_2018/mi 
nisteriesbudget/Foundations/DocLib/TashtiyotEnergyWater_Prop.pdf . The 2016 consumption is estimated at 9.5 BCM. 
47 The U.S. Geological Survey estimated in March 2010 that there was 122 trillion cubic feet (3,416 billion cubic meters) of 
natural gas in the Levant Basin, an area bounded by the Jordan Valley in the east and stretching towards Cyprus, including 
the coast of the Gaza Strip, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. The U.S. Geological Survey study of the Levant Basin also forecast 
a mean of 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil. See http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf . The principal 
explorer and operator in Israel's EEZs, Noble Energy of the United States, performed a “deep oil test” in 2014 and has 
noted that there are “multiple similar prospects” in its acreage. http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/Operations/ 
International/Eastern-Mediterranean-128.html      
48 Lately, in accordance with obligations imposed by the Israeli authorities (as will be discussed at length in Section 3 below), 
the Tanin and Karish gas fields were sold by the Delek Group to Energean Oil & Gas, a Greek firm incorporated in Cyprus. 
This sale was signed only in August 2016. Prior to that sale, Noble Energy had sold its holdings in Tanin and Karish to the 
Delek Group, so that the latter would have sole ownership over these fields before selling them to a new investor. See 
Sharon Udasin, “Greek Firm to Buy Israel’s Karish and Tanin Gas Reservoirs for 148.5 mil“, Jerusalem Post (18.8.2016), 
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The Sheshinski committee – an increase in taxes 
Following the discoveries, several Non-Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) and Members of 
Knesset raised the claim that the people’s (i.e., the Government’s) share in these huge energy resources 
was too small. They called for a steep increase in the royalties that the concessionaires were required to 
pay the Government (12.5%) and in the taxes due on the enormous profits that they were expected to 
make. In response to these calls, and to various private bills introduced in the Knesset to this effect, the 
Government in April 2010 appointed the Committee to Review the Fiscal Policy in the area of Oil and 
Gas Resources, headed by the economist Prof. Eytan Sheshinski (“The Sheshinski Committee”). The 
Committee submitted its conclusions in January 2011.49 It recommended introducing a levy on oil and 
gas profits that is to be determined according to the ratio between the accumulated income, after 
deducting the expenses of the project, royalties and levies paid in the past, and the total investment in 
the exploration and initial development of the field. The Committee recommended against changing the 
rate of the royalties. Subsequently, in April 2011, the Oil Profits Taxation Law, 2011 (later renamed the 
Natural Resources Profits Taxation Law, 2011), a law largely based on the Sheshinski Report, was 
passed by the Knesset.50 As a result, the owners of the gas fields became liable to a much higher tax 
burden than they had expected when they acquired the concession to explore for the gas. This law was 
constitutionally challenged by some of the gas companies and their shareholders, but the Supreme Court 
dismissed the challenge in August 2012.51 The Court held that the government has the right to increase 
its stake in oil and gas discoveries and dismissed the claim that this was a retroactive imposition of a 
tax:  
The new law that was legislated raises the tax rate on profits that will be produced from oil and gas 
after its legislation. It does not apply on revenue previously produced. This alone is enough to dismiss 
the retroactive tax argument altogether. That is so although the petitioners invested in discoveries at a 
certain tax rate, but the law and the rescindment of the deduction resulted in a higher tax rate. The 
future income of the petitioners is subject to the tax regime that will apply when the profits are 
produced. Therefore, the law that sets the new tax rate does not apply retroactively. This is a common 
legislative situation.52 
The Zemach Committee – export restrictions 
Until the appointment of this committee, there had been no restriction on the amount of natural gas that 
the concessionaires were entitled to export to foreign markets. They were therefore free to decide to 
whom they would sell their gas based exclusively on commercial considerations. However, following 
lobbying by several NGOs that called for a total ban on gas exports, in order to guarantee long-term 
supply to the Israeli market of environment-friendly natural gas, the Government decided to appoint yet 
another committee, the Zemach Committee. This committee, headed by the Director-General of the 
Ministry of Energy, Shaul Zemach, was appointed in October 2011, with the mandate to examine Israel’s 
natural gas sector and its future development. The Committee’s Report was published in April 5, 2012.53 
                                                     
available here: http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Greek-firm-to-buy-Israels-Karish-and-Tanin-gas-reservoirs-for-1485m-
464385  
49 Ministry of Finance, Summary of Draft Conclusions by the Sheshinski Committee, 10/11/2010. Available at: 
http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/financeisrael/pages/en/News/20101110.aspx 
.50 The Natural Resources Profits Taxation Law, 2011, Sefer Hachukim 5771 No. 2295 (10.4.2011), p. 806.    
51 H.C.J. 3734/11 Davidian et al. v. Knesset (2012).  
52 Ibid., para. 19 of Deputy President, Justice Naor’s opinion (emphasis in the original).  
53 See The Recommendations of the Inter-Ministerial Committee to Examine the Government's Policy Regarding Natural Gas 
in Israel – Executive Summary. Available at: http://energy.gov.il/English/PublicationsLibraryE/pa3161ed-B-
REV%20main%20recommendations%20Tzemach%20report.pdf     
The full report in Hebrew s available here: http://energy.gov.il/Subjects/NG/Documents/NGReportSep12.pdf  
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The Committee came to the conclusion that a total ban on gas export would not be in the interest of the 
country, considering that the domestic consumption was not very high, and that the possibility of 
exporting the gas is what served and will continue to serve as the incentive for private companies to 
invest in exploration and to obtain necessary financing.54 Should the government impose such a ban, the 
committee was of the opinion that it would most likely deter the required level of exploration and 
development of gas fields in Israel’s economic waters. All the same, the committee also acknowledged 
the importance of guaranteeing Israel’s domestic consumption of natural gas and it decided that given 
the circumstances it would be reasonable to guarantee these needs for the next 25 years. It assessed that 
the quantity required to supply these needs was 450 BCM, and recommended to review and update the 
quantity every five years.55 Hence, it recommended introducing export licensing for natural gas and 
determining an export quota for each gas field.  
These recommendations were met with strong criticism and demonstrations by NGOs, but eventually 
the Government adopted the Zemach Committee’s recommendations subject to the modification that 
the quantity that should be guaranteed to the domestic market is 540 BCM (about 57% of the estimated 
gas deposits, which would guarantee domestic consumption for 29 years).56 
As a result of this development, the gas companies had yet another restriction imposed on them: their 
exports are subject to a quota system, whereby they may export only around 43% of the gas in their 
possession, even in a situation where they can obtain significantly higher prices on the world market 
than in the Israeli market. This restriction also forces them to limit production according to the quantities 
that they are able to sell for domestic consumption. 
Another Supreme Court challenge: “No exports should be allowed” 
The Government decision to adopt the Zemach Committee’s recommendations (with some 
modifications) was also challenged at the Supreme Court. The challenge was not submitted by the gas 
companies against the export restriction, but rather by several NGOs who were of the opinion that no 
export of the natural gas should be allowed and that it should all be reserved for domestic consumption. 
The main legal argument of the petitioners was that the government lacked authority to make this 
decision, and that being such a significant matter, with far-reaching implications for the economy and 
the environment, it must be legislated in the Knesset and not passed by the cabinet alone.57 The argument 
was based on what is known as the “non-delegation doctrine”, according to which so-called “primary 
arrangements” ought to be determined by the legislator and not delegated to the executive branch.  
The petition was dismissed by a 5-2 majority decision in October 2013.58 It should be noted that the 
exact status of the non-delegation doctrine in Israeli constitutional law is disputed, among both judges 
                                                     
See also Amiram Barkat, "Tzemach Committee: Export 50% of Gas Reserves”, Globes 5/4/2012 (Available at: 
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-1000739532  
54 See the full report, ibid., p. 85. 
55 Ibid., p. 4. 
56 Government Decision No. 422, 26.6.2013. It should be noted that the Zemach Committee’s recommendations were adopted 
by seven out of the eight members of the committee. One of the members, the Director General of the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, wrote a dissenting opinion according to which the government should wait three more years 
until taking a decision in this matter, because the factual basis for the committee’s decisions was still too weak. If 
nevertheless the government should decide to disregard her recommendation, she recommended guaranteeing not 450 
BCM, but 550 BCM for domestic consumption. Hence, in terms of the quantity of gas set aside for domestic consumption, 
the government’s final decision was closer to this dissenting opinion than to that of the majority opinion. 
57 Yifa Yaacov, “High Court Gives Green Light to Gas Export”, Times of Israel (21.10.13), available here: http://www.times 
ofisrael.com/high-court-gives-green-light-to-gas-export/  
58 H.C.J. 4491/13 College of Law & Business v. Government of Israel. The decision to reject the petition was issued on October 
22, 2013. The full judgment with the reasons was issued on July 2, 2014. The judgment (in Hebrew) is available here: 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/13/910/044/s12/13044910.s12.htm .  
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and scholars.59 The President of the Supreme Court, Judge Asher Grunis, who wrote the majority 
opinion, expressed the prevailing opinion according to which the doctrine is at most an interpretative 
rule that creates a rebuttable presumption. Accordingly, the legislator is presumed not to have delegated 
to the administrative branch the authority to determine basic primary policy, but only to implement the 
policy according to the principles determined by the legislator.60 Where the act of the executive branch 
is violating fundamental rights, the rule will be more strictly applied than when there is no such 
violation.61 In the present case, the petitioners tried to argue that there was such a violation, because the 
government’s decision harms the rights of future generations, who may not be able to enjoy inexpensive 
and clean sources of energy, because the natural gas has run out. This argument was dismissed by the 
majority opinion, who found that there was no clear and concrete violation of fundamental rights but 
rather vague speculations about what might or might not happen in the future.62 The Court also found 
that the Knesset had in fact authorized by law the Minister of Infrastructures, Water and Energy to 
determine the amounts of oil or gas that right-holders were required to supply to the domestic market. 
The authorization is found in Article 33(a) of the Petroleum Law, 5712-1952, which provides:  
The Minister may, after consultation with the Authority, require lessees to supply first, at the market 
price, out of the petroleum63 produced by them in Israel and the petroleum products produced 
therefrom, such quantity of petroleum and petroleum products as, in his opinion, is required for Israeli 
consumption, and to refine it in Israel as far as they have refining facilities and to sell it in Israel. 
President Grunis chooses to interpret this provision in the general context of the Petroleum Law, whose 
objective is to maximize the country’s aggregate welfare and to balance between the need to preserve 
the State’s natural resources, on the one hand, and the need to create appropriate incentives to oil and 
gas explorers in order to facilitate exploration and development of these resources, on the other hand. 
The Court is of the opinion that it is difficult for the prime legislator to make the detailed provisions that 
are required to reach the proper balance in this field, and that therefore it is reasonable for the legislator 
to delegate to the executive branch the authority to determine how much gas should be reserved for the 
domestic market.64 The Vice President of the Court, Justice Miriam Naor, added that in her opinion, 
Article 34 of the Petroleum Law grants rights-holders an unlimited right to export the petroleum they 
find, unless this right is limited by a Minister decision under Article 33 of the Law, by regulations or by 
contract.65 That is another reason that Article 33 must be seen as a general authorization to restrict 
                                                     
59  See Gideon Sapir, “Nondelegation”, 32 Tel-Aviv University Law Review 5 (2009) (Hebrew); Yoav  Dotan, “Non Delegation 
and the Revised Principle of Legality”, 42 Mishpatim 379-447, 2012) (Hebrew); Barak Medina, “The Constitutional Rule 
Regarding Non-Delegation – A Response to Yoav Dotan and Gideon Sapir”, 42 Mishpatim (2012) (Hebrew); Aharon 
Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitation (Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 112. H.C.J. 
244/00 Siach Chadash Association v. Minister of National Infrastructures P.D. 56(6)25 (2002) on p. 58; H.C.J. 326/97 
Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense IsrLR 139, 502 (Barak J.); H.C.J. 1800/07 Israel Bar Association v. Civil Service 
Commission (7.10.2008), para. 7 of Levy J.’s opinion. 
60 H.C.J. 4491/13, supra note 58, para. 26 of the opinion of President Grunis.  
61 Ibid., para. 21. 
62 One should recall that there are high chances of finding more natural gas in Israel’s EEZ, and even if no gas is found there, 
gas could always be imported from foreign sources. Hence, the argument about harming future generations’ fundamental 
rights is not a very strong one. 
63 The term “petroleum” is defined in article 1 of the Law as: “any petroleum fluid, whether liquid or gaseous and includes oil, 
natural gas, natural  gasoline, condensates and related fluid hydrocarbons and also asphalt and other solid petroleum 
hydrocarbons  when dissolved  in and producible with fluid petroleum”. 
64 H.C.J. 4491/13, supra note 58, para. 42 of the opinion of President Grunis. 
65 Ibid., para. 2 of the opinion of Vice President Naor. Article 34 of the Petroleum Law provides: “A lessee  may, subject to 
the regulations, import petroleum and petroleum products into Israel and may refine petroleum, whether produced in Israel 
or imported from abroad and may process, transport, export and trade in such petroleum and petroleum products.” 
(emphasis added). 
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exports and to determine the natural gas quantities required for the entire domestic economy, and not 
just for a particular right-holder.  
The two dissenting judges, Jubran and Rubinstein, were of the opinion that to determine the export 
policy of natural gas, and the amount required for domestic consumption in Israel is a primary 
arrangement (I would add: similar to what Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. Supreme Court  once called 
“important matters”66) that needs to be determined by the primary legislator.67 Article 33, in their 
opinion, does not delegate such an authority to the Minister. Rather it authorizes him to implement in 
relation to each and every rights-holder the general policy that the Knesset has determined.68 Since no 
such policy has been determined yet, the approval of the Zemach Committee’s recommendations in this 
regard must be brought before the Knesset as part of a general legislative scheme in relation to the 
natural gas sector.  
In this specific challenge, the dissenting opinions of these two judges, standing up for what they 
considered the protection of democratic rule through the parliament, did not make the day. However, 
their positions are bound to make a difference in a later challenge against the government’s dealings 
with the gas companies, as we will soon see. 
Antitrust problems 
Although having overcome this legal challenge, the troubles of the investors were not over yet. Now 
comes the turn of the Antitrust Commissioner. It so happened that all of the proven gas fields were in 
the possession of the same two companies: Noble Energy and the Delek Group, whose partnership had 
majority holdings in all of the four fields.69 There had been several other companies searching for natural 
gas in Israel in the past, including foreign ones, but only the Noble-Delek partnership was lucky to find 
any. Hence, the situation whereby a partnership of two companies is controlling Israel’s entire gas 
supply obviously raises serious competition concerns. Initially, the Antitrust Commissioner Ronit Kan, 
had in 2006 given the companies an exemption from the prohibition against restrictive agreements.70 
However, in 2011, the then Commissioner, Prof. David Gilo, notified the gas companies that he intends 
to declare them to be parties to a prohibited restrictive agreement in the Leviathan gas field.71 In 2012, 
he declared them to be a monopoly in the natural gas sector.72  
                                                     
66 In an often quoted passage dealing with the doctrine of non-delegation in U.S. constitutional law: “[t]he line has not been 
exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from 
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such 
general provision to fill up the details.” Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825), at p. 43. 
67 H.C.J. 4491/13, supra note 58, paras. 55-89 of the opinion of Justice Jubran; and para. 2 of the opinion of Justice Rubinstein. 
68 Ibid., para. 3 of the opinion of Justice Jubran; and para. 15 of the opinion of Justice Rubinstein. 
69 They were not the sole partners. Other companies, such as Ratio Oil Exploration (1992) Limited Partnership, Dor Gas 
Exploration Limited Partnership, and Isramco Negev 2 Limited Partnership, have also certain percentages in some of the 
gas fields, but these are minority shares in relation to Delek and Noble’s holdings. Another partner is Avner Gas and Oil 
Exploration LP, but it is largely controlled by the Delek Group.  
70 Israel Antitrust Authority, “Decision under Article 14 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 5748-1988 regarding the 
Granting of an Exemption for a Trade Restraint: Agreement between Delek Group and Isramco Negev, Noble Energy and 
others” (August 22, 2006) (Hebrew), available here: http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/7794/6178.pdf  
71 Press Release: “General Director of Restrictive Trade Practices Considers Declaring Delek to have a Monopoly in the Supply 
of Natural Gas and to determine that Delek, Avner, Noble and Ratio were Sides to a Restrictive Arrangement in relation to 
the 'Leviathan' Joint Venture” (September 6, 2011), available here: http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/32860/Natural 
%20gas_2011.pdf .  
72 Press Release: “The General Director of Restrictive Trade Practices Declares the Partners in the Natural Gas Reservoir 
'Tamar' to have a Monopoly on Israel's Natural Gas Supply” (November 13. 2012), available here: 
http://www.antitrust.gov.il/files/32858/Natural%20gas.pdf . 
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After negotiations with the companies, in March 2014 a draft compromise in relation to Leviathan was 
reached whereby Delek, Avner and Noble will sell their holdings in Karish and Tanin (the small gas 
fields) to a buyer that will undertake to sell and market its gas only in Israel.73 This buyer will also 
receive options to purchase 15.2 BCM gas from Leviathan. The gas companies can market the rest of 
the gas in Israel until January 1, 2020, at which time the Commissioner will reassess the competitive 
situation. The compromise also included certain arrangements in relation to the Tamar field. However, 
in December 2014, after holding a public hearing on the draft compromise, Prof. Gilo announced that 
he has changed his mind and will not submit the compromise to the anti-trust court.74  
The Gas Framework – An attempt to resolve all the regulatory issues 
Therefore, the Government decided to appoint a team, headed by the chairperson of Israel’s National 
Economic Council, Prof. Eugene Kandel, to look for an alternative solution. The team was composed 
of representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Antitrust Authority and others. They heard the position of the gas companies and started designing the 
so-called “Gas Framework” that was to reflect a compromise between the Government and the 
companies. Without a solution, the companies would not and could not have proceeded to make the 
huge investments required to develop the Leviathan gas field and to sign gas sales contracts to support 
the financing of the development. It should be noted that the compromise was reached under the shadow 
of Noble Energy’s threat to sue the State under the Cyprus-Israel BIT, although it is not clear how 
credible this threat was.75 However, in May 2015, Prof. David Gilo announced his resignation from his 
position of Antitrust Commissioner, in view of his opposition to the emerging gas-framework. As a 
result, and because of the prolonged search for a new Commissioner, it was decided that the exemption 
under the antitrust law, as part of the gas framework, would be given by the Minister of Economy, 
making unprecedented use of Article 52 of the law.76  
                                                     
73 "Regulator orders Delek, Noble Energy to sell gas fields" 27/3/2014 (globes) available at:  http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-
regulator-orders-delek-noble-energy-to-sell-gas-fields-1000927892  
74 Avi Bar-Eli " Antitrust Chief Warns He May Break Up Natural Gas Monopoly" 23/12/2014 (Haaretz). Available at: 
http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/business/.premium-1.633228 .  
75 “Report: Noble Energy Threatens Legal Action Against Israel”, Arutz Sheva, Israel National News (September 3, 2015) 
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/200276#.Vzr2tJF95pg : “Senior Noble executives delivered the 
ultimatum on the future of the offshore Leviathan field at a meeting with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu this week, 
according to Maariv. It said the firm would pursue international arbitration if a framework deal with Israel laying out 
parameters for developing Leviathan, among other issues, is not enacted "in the near future." See also: 
http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001089189 . This legal option has possibly become available because 
Noble Energy Mediterranean Inc., a Cayman Islands company, apparently transferred its holdings in the Israeli gas fields 
to a subsidiary incorporated in Cyprus, in order to come under the Cyprus-Israel BIT. The Israeli authorities, however, 
claim that under Noble’s concession, it is under the obligation to receive approval from the Ministry of Energy for any 
transfer of its concessionary rights and that such approval has never been granted. Hence, the transfer of the holdings to the 
Cyprus company is invalid and an arbitration tribunal under the Israel-Cyprus BIT would have to dismiss the claim for lack 
of jurisdiction. From reports in the press it appears that Israel’s State Comptroller is currently investigating whether 
government approval was or was not given, and how Noble Energy manage to reach a position where it could threaten to 
sue the government. See: Hedy Cohen, “The State Comptroller is probing whether Noble Energy asked to transfer 
ownership of its Israeli licenses to a Cypriot subsidiary.” Globes (16.12.15), available here: 
http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-israel-exposed-to-huge-noble-energy-lawsuit-in-cyprus-1001088620 . One should also 
mention that in the Supreme Court challenge of the Gas Framework discussed below, an “American Legal Opinion” 
regarding the possible implications of a change in policy under International Law was submitted to the Court by the 
government, but the Court decided not to refer to it (See H.C.J. 4374/15, infra note 87, on p. 75). This legal opinion is 
confidential, so we can only speculate about its contents.  
76 The Restrictive Trade Practices Law, 5748-1988, Article 52 provides: “The Minister may, following consultation with the 
Knesset's Economic Affairs Committee, exempt a restrictive trade practice from all or some of the provisions of this Law, 
if he believes that such action is necessary for reasons of foreign policy or national security.” 
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The draft gas framework was published in July 2015, and it was made subject to a public hearing, both 
in writing and orally.77 The framework requires Noble and Delek to sell their holdings in the relatively 
small Karish and Tanin gas fields within 14 months to a buyer that will be approved by the authorities.78 
Delek - through its units Delek Drilling and Avner Oil Exploration - will have six years to sell its entire 
31.3 percent stake in the large and currently Israel’s only producing Tamar gas field, and Noble will 
have to trim its stake in Tamar to 25 percent from 36 percent.79 The companies will commit themselves 
to complete the development of the Leviathan gas field (an investment estimated at around $5-6 
billion80) until 2019, so that natural gas can be extracted and supplied from there to the Israeli market 
by July 31, 2019. In return for the fulfilment of these obligations, and several other ones designed to 
ensure competition in the natural gas market in Israel, the companies will receive the required 
exemptions from the antitrust prohibitions. The framework also includes provisions on the sale price of 
the gas, setting a price ceiling and enabling consumers to choose the less expensive of two options. An 
element was introduced which ensures that domestic prices will always be lower than export prices. 
There are new provisions in the framework dealing with how to calculate and how to administer the 
export quotas.  
Finally, at the demand of the companies and especially of Noble Energy, a stabilization clause was 
included in the deal. According to this chapter of the framework (chapter 10), titled “A Stable Regulatory 
Environment”, the Government undertook to refrain from changing, for a period of 10 years, its policy 
and regulation in relation to the gas market within three of the areas discussed above (taxation, exports 
and antitrust). The government also undertook to oppose any private bill tabled in the parliament aimed 
at changing anything in the above fields. If such private bill should pass nevertheless, the government 
undertook to initiate a bill that would reinstate the previous situation.81 The government also undertook 
to carefully examine any change in the regulation of the gas market (i.e., changes to which the 
stabilization clause does not apply) and to aspire to design a policy that corresponds with accepted 
standards in OECD countries. The chapter includes two milestones – in 2017 and 2020 – that allow the 
government to re-evaluate its commitment if the development of the Leviathan gas field should not 
progress in accordance with the gas companies’ commitments. 
The gas framework was adopted by the Government, subject to some amendments, in August 2015.82 
One of the amendments related to “domestic content”: the companies undertook to invest at least $500 
million over a period of eight years in Israeli content, such as the employment of Israeli worker and 
purchase of equipment and services from companies registered in Israel (including foreign companies).83 
                                                     
77 Ministry of Energy, “The draft outline regarding the increase of the amount of natural gas extracted from the national gas 
field “Tamar” and fast development of the natural gas fields “Leviathan”, “Karish” and Tanin” and other natural gas fields” 
(Hebrew), (hereafter referred to as “the Gas Framework”) available at:  http://energy.gov.il/abouttheoffice/newsand 
updates/documents/shimua/dov_312_2015.pdf 
78 Ibid., p.8. 
79 Ibid, p.4-7. 
80 This is the updated estimate, as it appears in Delek and Avner’s financial statements published in May, 2016. 
81 This obligation was not in the original draft, but was added to the Framework by the Government’s resolution (see next 
footnote).  
82 Government Resolution No. 476 (16.8.15) (Hebrew), available here: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/Gov 
Decisions/2015/Pages/dec476.aspx  
83 Ibid., Chapter 9. Interestingly, the Resolution does not require that the products be made in Israel in order to qualify as 
“domestic content”, only that they are bought from firms registered in Israel, including foreign firms. One may speculate 
that this was formulated so in order to avoid violation of Israel’s obligations under international trade agreements, such as 
the GATT and the WTO TRIMS Agreement (see Article 1(a) of the Annex to this agreement). Salaries to domestic workers 
can qualify as “domestic content” up to a limit of 20% of the total undertaking. Expenditures on academic or industrial 
research undertaken in Israel, whether purchased by the companies themselves, or by related companies abroad that deal 
in the gas and oil sector, will also be considered “domestic content”, as will expenditures on professional training in 
corporate social responsibility of the gas companies. 
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The framework was also brought to a vote in the Knesset and approved by a 59-51 majority in September 
2015.84 However, this was not a legislative process, but only as a political resolution.  
Since the granting of a Ministerial exemption under Article 52 of the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 
was part of the Government’s commitment under the framework, it now became crucial that Aryeh Deri, 
the Minister of Economy, would grant this exemption to the gas companies. However, Mr. Deri, the 
leader of the Shas Party, a religious socially oriented party that was a member of the coalition 
government, after lengthy deliberation, announced that he did not feel that he could grant the exemption. 
Hence, after more political wrangling, it was agreed in November that he would resign his post and 
assume a different ministerial position, so that his authorities would be reassigned to the Prime Minister. 
The Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, as the Acting Minister of Economy, then announced that he 
intended to make use of his authority under this article. After conducting the mandatory consultation 
procedure with the Knesset’s Economy Committee – which recommended by a majority decision not to 
grant the exemption under Article 5285 – the Prime Minister went ahead and granted the exemption in 
December 2015.86  
The Supreme Court strikes down the Framework 
Less than two weeks later, several NGOs submitted a petition to the Supreme Court (in its capacity as 
the High Court of Justice) challenging the gas framework. The challenges focused on two central issues: 
(1) the exercise of the authority under Article 52, based on the claim that there were no genuine reasons 
of foreign policy or national security to justify the exemption and claims against the decision procedure; 
(2) the Stabilization Clause, challenging the legality and reasonableness of the Government’s 
commitment to prevent itself and future governments from using its prerogative and duty to regulate, 
when this is needed.  
On March 27, 2016, the Supreme Court handed down its earth-shaking decision, striking down the entire 
gas framework.87 In a 4-1 judgment, the court found that the stabilization clause unduly restricted future 
governments’ freedom to regulate the gas market and hence is undemocratic and 
unconstitutional. Deputy Supreme Court President Elyakim Rubinstein wrote: "The stabilization clause 
in this chapter of the framework, in which the government undertakes for a decade to not only not 
legislate but to also fight any legislation against the framework’s provisions, was decided without 
authority – and as such is rejected. It was made in contrast to the general principle of administrative law 
regarding the prohibition of shackling the authority’s ability to govern. The government does not have 
the power to decide not to decide and not to act." Rubinstein J. added that this was especially the case 
when the government seeks to limit the discretion of the next government, "whose composition and 
ideology will be different than this one’s."88 He also stated that the stabilization clause substantially 
binds the Knesset’s ability to use its discretion. In reaching his decision, Rubinstein reviewed the 
                                                     
84 “Controversial Natural Gas Deal Passes Knesset”, Times of Israel, September 7, 2015, available at: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/controversial-natural-gas-deal-passes-knesset/ . 
85 This was expected, since the majority in the Committee is held by the Opposition, who turned the resistance to the Gas 
Framework into its major political objective.  
86 As reported in the “Annual Report on Competition Policy Developments in Israel”, 15-17/6/2015, at p. 4,  Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/AR(2016)5&docLanguage=En  
87 H.C.J. 4374/15 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime Minister (27.3.16). See also Talam Yahav, “High 
Court rejects Israel's natural gas plan”, Ynet News (27.3.16) http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
4783787,00.html . 
88 Ibid., p. 65-66. For a detailed description and discussion of the judgment, see the case comment of Rachel Frid-de Vries, 
“Stability Shaken? Israeli High Court Strikes Down the Stabilization Clause in the Israeli Government’s Gas Plan “, 18 
Journal of World Investment and Trade 1-10 (2017). 
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international literature on stabilization clauses89 and explained the background to their use. He quoted 
several examples of freezing clauses, while stressing the fact that the states involved are all developing 
countries. He notes that it is therefore not surprising that OECD countries do not include stabilization 
clauses in contracts with energy companies,90 and that these are used mostly by states with a weak 
judicial system, in terms of independence, corruption, due process etc., which Coale calls “quasi-
states”.91 This reasoning resonates with the perceptions that have shaped Israel’s BIT policy, discussed 
above,92 according to which Israel is a developed country with a stable regulatory environment and a 
reliable judiciary, and therefore does not need BITs to attract foreign investment.  
Only one judge, Justice Noam Solberg, dissented and was of the opinion that the stabilization clause 
was valid. He stressed the fact that the clause did not restrict the Knesset’s right to legislate, and that it 
therefore remains free to initiate changes to the regulation if it thinks that such are required. The 
Government’s undertaking to actively oppose such attempts does not mean that the Knesset cannot 
succeed in making regulatory changes if the necessary majority is found. Judge Solberg also notes that 
government obligations to initiate certain laws in the parliament are not uncommon. Such obligations 
are undertaken, for instance, pursuant to international agreements concluded by the government (and 
which do not require parliamentary approval, like in other so-called dualistic legal systems, such as the 
United Kingdom) or pursuant to election promises by political parties, and there is nothing illegitimate 
in that. He does not see any meaningful distinction between the obligation to legislate a certain law and 
the obligation to actively oppose the legislation of a certain law. Both of them relate to how the 
Government is to use its governmental discretion in relation to legislation. While he agrees that an 
absolute denial of government discretion is unlawful, he is of the opinion that this is not the case here, 
since the government always has the right to depart from a government promise when special 
circumstances justify it.93 In such case, the government will have to compensate the investors, and hence 
the clause in question is not very different from an economic balancing clause, which Justice Rubinstein 
appeared as willing to accept. Judge Solberg acknowledges that such duty of compensation may create 
a “chilling effect”, but he does not consider this as negating the government’s discretion. The extent of 
the effect (as a function of the amount of compensation) depends on the nature of the change and of the 
expenses it causes to the investors, and sometimes this will be found to be a so-called “efficient breach” 
where the gains from the change in regulation exceeds the costs of compensation.  
The Government’s lawyers had argued before the Court that the stabilization clause is a prerequisite of 
the entire Gas Framework.94 This proposition had, in fact, been presented before the Court by Netanyahu 
himself, who appeared before the Supreme Court, making it the first time in Israeli history that a prime 
                                                     
89 Among them: Peter D. Cameron, Stabilization in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for 
Oil and Gas Investors, at p. 30 (Association of International Petroleum Negotiators, 2006). Margarita T.B Coale, 
“Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Transactions” 30 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 217 (2001-2002) 
90 John G. Ruggie, Stabilization Projects and Human Rights – A Research Project Conducted for IFC and the United Nations 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Business and Human Rights, p. 19 (2009); Mario Mansour & Carole 
Nakhle, Fiscal Stabilization in Oil and Gas Contracts: Evidence and Implication, (The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
January 2016), p. 13. 
91 Coale, supra note 89, p. 221-222. 
92 See chapter 2.2 above. 
93 This is an established rule in Israeli government contract law. See for instance, Gavriela Shalev, The Law of Public 
Procurement (1999), chap. 6 (Hebrew); and H.C.J. 4893/14 Zoabi v. State of Israel paras. 45-46 (3.3.16); H.C.J. 6133/14 
Gurevitz v. Israeli Knesset para. 63 (2015). A similar rule can be found in German and French Administrative Law. See 
for instance, Mahendra P. Singh, German Administrative Law in Common Law Perspective (Springer, 2001), p. 101; and 
L. Neville Brown & John S. Bell, French Administrative Law (5th ed., Oxford, 1998) p. 203 (in French Law, administrative 
contracts are seen differently from private contracts, whereas for the former there is “an underlying need to recognize the 
predominance of the public interest, an interest which must prevail, even to the extent of overruling the express terms of 
the contract”). 
94 H.C.J. 4374/15, supra note 71, at p.83. 
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minister appears and addresses the Supreme Court.95 Hence, and since the Court in its majority opinion 
decided that the clause was not valid, the Court reached the conclusion that the whole Framework had 
to be struck down.96 It did so, although all of the other challenges that the petitioners had raised against 
the Framework were dismissed.  The Court postponed the effect of its decision by 12 months, in order 
to give the government the time to reach an alternative arrangement. Rubinstein J. was of the view that 
such arrangement must be part of a legislative scheme approved by the Knesset.97 However, the majority 
(3 against 2) of the judges rejected Justice Rubinstein’s opinion that a new framework must be made by 
parliamentary legislation.98  
One cannot help but wondering about the logic of Justice Rubinstein’s position, which seems to be self-
contradictory. On the one hand, he considers the stabilization clause to be unconstitutional and 
undemocratic because it binds future governments – despite conceding that as a mere government 
decision, the government has the right to depart from its promise when special circumstances justify it.99 
On the other hand, he requires the government to fix the problem by having the entire gas framework, 
or at least its main principles, entrenched by legislation, thus making it much stronger and much harder 
to depart from. In this connection, one should note that during the negotiations with the gas companies 
leading up to the framework, it was Noble Energy that demanded that the stabilization clause be 
entrenched in legislation.100 However, the Government, based on legal advice, so as to maintain some 
flexibility in case of significant changes of circumstances in the future, rejected this demand.101 If the 
Government were to follow Rubinstein’s instructions, it would in fact only aggravate the problem that 
had caused the Court to strike down the gas framework in the first place. Fortunately, on this point, 
Rubinstein’s opinion did not become the binding ruling of the Court. 
A new compromise 
In view of the Supreme Court’s decision, the Government started examining its options in trying to 
salvage the Gas Framework. A team of government officials headed by Prof. Eugene Kandel started 
new deliberations and negotiations with the investors. The idea of granting a Government financial 
guarantee to the investors, which had been raised as an option, was rejected off-hand by the Ministry of 
Finance. In May 2016 a new compromise was reached. According to the amended version of the Gas 
Framework, the Government still commits itself to maintain and not change the regulatory regime that 
                                                     
95 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Netanyahu to High Court: Gas deal helps chance of peace with many countries”, Jerusalem Post 
14/2/1016. Available at: http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahu-confronts-High-Court-to-
defend-natural-gas-policy-in-unprecedented-personal-appearance-444846 
96 H.C.J. 4374/15, supra note 71, at p .180. Judge Hayut dissented on this point. While she agreed that the stabilization clause 
was unconstitutional and had to be struck down, she was of the opinion that there was no need to strike down the other 
parts of the Framework and that one could leave it to the gas companies to decide whether they want to accept the plan as 
is without the stabilization clause or reject it entirely. 
97 Ibid, p.90 and 95. 
98 Ibid, p.179, point D: Judges Fogelman, Hayut and Solberg rejected this requirement, against the dissenting opinions of 
Judges Rubinstein and Jubran. The reasoning of the majority judges on this issue differed. Judge Solberg agreed with 
Judges Rubinstein and Jubran that the Gas Framework could be seen as a Primary Arrangement, but he held that even so, 
the Knesset had already determined all of the principal issues dealt with in the framework and delegated the powers to 
implement the policies to the executive branch. Judge Chayut agreed with Solberg on that and made the point to disagree 
with Judges Rubinstein and Jubran’s opinion according to which “the whole is greater than the sum of its parts” and that 
because of the aggregation of so many important issues in one government decision, it needed to be adopted as a whole by 
the Knesset. Judge Fogelman agreed with Solberg that all the necessary powers had been delegated by the Knesset and 
therefore found no need to decide on whether the framework was a “Primary Arrangement” or not.  
99 H.C.J. 4374/15, supra note 71, at p. 80 and p. 97. 
100 The source of this information is Dr. Yuval Steinitz, the Minister of Energy, in a speech in the Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan 
University, April 11, 2016, in the presence of the author. 
101 Ibid. 
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applies to the gas sector. However, unlike the previous framework, it does not commit itself to fight 
private legislative initiatives in the Knesset. It also does not set a fixed time-period for its commitment, 
thus leaving discretion to future governments. However, the Government promises to propose 
alternative solutions in order to make up for any such changes that are detrimental to the gas companies, 
without committing in advance on the content of such solutions. In return for this change in the gas 
framework, the gas companies have received a benefit in relation to the original framework: instead of 
having to sell the Karish and Tanin gas fields within 14-18 months, they will have to do so within 16-
20 months.102 The amended gas framework was approved by the Government with only one minister 
voting against it.103 
Antitrust class action for unfair gas prices 
The gas companies have not yet solved all of their legal problems. There is still a pending class action 
lawsuit submitted in 2014 and valued around 13 billion dollars against the holders and operators of the 
Tamar gas field.104 The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have been abusing their monopoly power to 
charge inflated prices for their natural gas sold to the Israel Electric Company (IEC). Since these unfair 
prices (“double its fair value”, according to the claim) have been passed on to the IEC’s costumers, the 
plaintiffs allege that they have the right to claim damages from the defendants on behalf of all the 
electricity consumers in Israel. After the Gas Framework was approved (and later its compromised 
version), the defendants claimed that the class action should be dismissed, since the Framework had 
dealt with all the antitrust issues and granted an exemption to the companies.105 Interestingly, the 
Attorney-General (AG) appeared before the court and supported the defendants’ petition to dismiss the 
action. The AG argued that the drastic reduction in the gas prices, as demanded by the plaintiffs, might 
seriously harm the ability to develop new gas fields, prevent entry of new competitors and undermine 
the entire gas framework.106 However, Judge Esther Stemmer of the Central District Court ruled that the 
exemption given to the gas monopoly in the Gas Framework did not exempt them from the provision in 
the antitrust law that forbids abuse of monopoly positions.107 Hence, this class action suit is still looming 
over the gas companies and only future will tell how it will be resolved. 
                                                     
102 In practice, the Delek Group sold the rights in Tanin and Karish within just a few months to the Greek company Energean 
Oil & Gas, which has already started to raise capital and look for an operator to develop these two gas fields. See supra 
note 48. 
103 Hedy Cohen, “Israel Cabinet Approves New Gas Agreement”, Globes (22.5.16), available here: http://www.globes.co.il/en/ 
article-israeli-cabinet-approves-new-gas-agreement-1001126176 . The dissenting minister was Avi Gabay, the Minister for 
the Protection of the Environment. 
104 Ya’acov Zalel, “Israel Tamar Faces $13BN Class Action”, in Natural Gas World (November 24, 2016).available here: 
http://www.naturalgasworld.com/a-13-bn-class-action-against-tamar-go-ahead-34605  
105 Ibid. 
106 Avi Bar-Eli, “The Government’s Explanation: Why the Price of Gas did not Come Down” The Marker (28.6.2016)  
(Hebrew), available here: http://www.themarker.com/dynamo/1.2988838  
107 Judge Stemmer’s decision: Class Action 35507-06-14 (Central) Nizri v. Noble Energy Mediterranean Ltd. et al.  
(23.11.2016). In her decision, Judge Stemmer found that the fact that the High Court of Justice had found the Gas 
Framework to be reasonable, does not prevent a non-administrative claim against the price charged by the monopoly 
holders. She also found that the Article 52 exemption does not relate to abuse of dominant position under Article 29A of 
the Trade Restraints Law. Indeed, the framework does not list Article 29A as one of the provisions that the gas companies 
are exempt from. The fact that the Gas Framework has been approved does not mean that the price that the companies have 
been charging is reasonable, although it may be taken into account at a later stage when the evidence on the reasonableness 
of the price will be examined. One would expect this decision to be appealed by the defendants before the Supreme Court. 
Ya’acov Zalel, supra note 104.  
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The impact of the Natural Gas Saga on the investment climate 
It would be reasonable to presume that the regulatory turmoil experienced by Noble Energy since its 
discoveries of natural gas in Israel’s EEZ in the Mediterranean, has had a negative impact on the 
investment climate in Israel for foreign investors, in particular in the natural resources sector. In addition 
to the many and frequent changes to the regulations applying to the natural gas sector, the Government 
also introduced drastic changes to the regulatory environment relating to all other natural resources. In 
2013, the so-called “Second Sheshinski Committee” was appointed with the task of making 
recommendations in relation to the payments that should accrue to the government from the use of other 
natural resources. The committee recommended raising significantly the royalties for the use of such 
resources, as well as the taxes imposed on the profits from them.108 Not surprisingly, these 
recommendations were met with fierce opposition from existing concessionaires, and in particular from 
the Israel Chemicals group, the owner of the Dead Sea Works and other natural resources companies.109 
The former is also reported to have suspended nearly $2 billion in investment in Israel because of the 
plans.110 Instead, it has been expanding operations and buying companies in China, Britain and Spain. 
Nevertheless, the recommendations have been moving slowly through the system and were finally 
approved by legislation in November 2015.111 
Many of these changes may be justified in themselves, in particular those recommended by the two 
Sheshinski Committees.112 However, it is the accumulation of so many changes in a short time and the 
uncertainty about what else one can expect in the future, that may cause serious damage to Israel’s 
ability to attract much needed foreign investments in these fields. Add to that what appears to be the 
inability of the Government to deliver on its promises, to govern its own natural resources, and to create 
a stable and predictable investment climate, and one can understand why we may have a serious 
problem. This assessment was recently supported by a study performed by the Bank of Israel on the 
Government’s policies in the natural gas field:113 
Such policy [i.e., when the Government uses new information to improve the lot of the Israeli public 
at the expense of the entrepreneurs], when it is employed in moderation, in accordance with what is 
common abroad, and in view of the improvement of the lot of the entrepreneurs in relation to their 
original projections (as was the case, for instance in the adoption of the Sheshinski Committee 
recommendations), may benefit the citizens even in the long run. However, a series of decisions within 
                                                     
108 The Conclusions of the Committee Examining the State’s Share Received for the Use by Private Players of National Nature 
Resources, October 2014, available here: http://mof.gov.il/Committees/NatureResourcesCommittee/Maskanot_Final 
Report.pdf  
109 See e.g., “Israel Chemicals Vows to Fight ‘Erroneous’ Tax Recommendations”, Israel Hayom October 20, 2014. 
http://www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.php?id=20849  
110 See Meirav Arlosoroff, Ora Cohen & Zvi Zrahiya,“Israel Chemicals Suffers Blow as MKs Approve Higher Taxes and 
Treasury seeks fines”, Haaretz November 9, 2015, available here: http://www.haaretz.com/israel-
news/business/1.684942  .  
111 This was done by the Economic Efficiency Law (Legislative Amendments to Reach the Objectives of the Budget for FY 
2015 and FY 2016), 5776-2016, which introduced some amendments to the Natural Resources Profits Taxation Law, 5771-
2011. According to this amendment, profits from natural resources can be taxed to up to 42%.  
112 The Second Sheshinski Committee was in fact assisted by a team of experts from the International Monetary Fund, as part 
of the Fund’s technical assistance to its members. The team submitted its own assessment and recommendations to the 
Committee, noting, among others, that Israel’s taxation of the profits from natural resources, was one of the lowest in the 
world. See p. 95 of the  Second Sheshinski Report, supra note 108. I am not aware of any further legal or political actions 
taken by Israel Chemicals after the amended law was approved by the Knesset in November 2015. 
113 Dr. Yoav Friedman, Research Department of the Bank of Israel, The Government’s Policy in the Field of Natural Gas 
Production, Seven Years after the Discovery of ‘Tamar’, Periodical Papers 2016.1 (March 2016), available here: 
http://www.boi.org.il/he/NewsAndPublications/PressReleases/Documents/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%A7%D7%A8-%20
%D7%9E%D7%93%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%95%D7%AA%20%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%
9C%D7%94%20%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%A3%20%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%A7%D7%AA%20%D7%94%D
7%92%D7%96%20%D7%94%D7%98%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%99.pdf     
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a relatively short period, which repeatedly hurt the entrepreneurs to the benefit of the consumers, 
might be considered in the eyes of potential entrepreneurs and investors in the future as harming the 
business environment, may cause a decline in their investments in Israel and harm the economy. Such 
harm may exceed the benefit that can be obtained from these decisions in the short run. 
 The study also addresses the impact of the various restrictions, in particular those imposed on the 
exportation of natural gas, on the investment in the development of the gas fields:114 
While the State is interested in the development of the gas fields for the domestic market, among other 
things in order to produce surplus and encourage competition, the entrepreneurs are interested in 
maximizing their profits, and they will have difficulty in financing expensive development of the 
natural gas reserves which will create a surplus of supply in the domestic market, in particular when 
they are not permitted or are unable to export the gas. This problem exists especially in relation to the 
development of the Tanin and Karish fields and it reduces the probability of their development in the 
short run. It also affects the exploration and development of new natural gas fields at the present time. 
Can it be scientifically proven that this series of decisions to the detriment of the investors, and the 
regulatory instability described above, have caused, and will continue to cause, a decline in foreign 
investment in energy exploration? Clearly the answer is no. The economic reality is too complex, with 
too many factors influencing the decisions of investors whether, how much and when to invest in a 
certain country and certain sector, for us to be able to provide any conclusive evidence on this question. 
This is true even when we try to analyze figures from the past, and so much more when we try to make 
predictions about the future. Therefore, all we can do is to point to certain facts and to discuss their 
significance for the question we are pondering along with their limitations. 
The first fact is that since the first Sheshinski Committee was appointed in 2010, and until the 
compromised Gas Framework was approved in May 2016, almost no new investors entered the natural 
gas or oil exploration market. The companies that already held concessions and gas fields in the 
Mediterranean continued to invest in their holdings, mainly in the Tamar field whose development was 
already close to completion. However, since that development was completed in 2012, and despite the 
fact that the more recently found gas fields of Leviathan (2010), Tanin (2012) and Karish (2013) 
required huge investments in order to be developed, there has been a sharp decline in the volumes of 
investment in gas and oil exploration from 2013 and onwards. This year coincides with the year that the 
Zemach Committee’s recommendations were approved and once it became clear that the regulatory 
arrangements in the field were still extremely unpredictable. The figures showing this decline have been 
obtained by the present author from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, as showed below.115 
                                                     
114 Ibid., p. 17. 
115 The CBS was precluded from providing the author with actual dollar figures because of legal confidentiality reasons. 
Instead, they provided relative figures indexed on the basis of 2005. 
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The above figures represent both domestic and foreign investment volumes in gas and oil offshore 
exploration and development in Israel, including investment in the development of rigs, platforms, 
marine pipelines, offshore processing stations, coastal installations etc.  
An important factor that must be taken into account when assessing the significance of these figures is 
that since June 2012 and until November 15, 2016, there were no new offshore licenses awarded as a 
result of a decision of the Minister of Energy to “close the sea” for new licenses116 in order to reorganize 
the system of licenses.117 This could account for part of the steep decline in investments. However, as 
noted, it does not account for the lack of investment in the development of the existing undeveloped gas 
fields, or of the low investment levels in exploration of existing licenses. According to a report by the 
State Comptroller, at the time of the “closure”, on more than 60% of Israel’s marine territory there were 
existing exploration rights, most of which had no connection to the Delek Group or to Noble. However, 
the explorations decreased gradually, so that in 2013 there were only three drills and in 2014 only one.118 
For example, until 2015 there were two valid licenses in the offshore fields named Sara and Myra 
estimated to hold around 70% of the gas volumes of the Tamar field, held by a partnership of mainly 
Israeli companies, and which have not yet been fully explored.119 Two initial drills were not successful. 
However, seismic studies indicated the possibility of oil and gas at deeper strata that were not 
explored.120 If the holders of the concession had been successful in convincing a strong financial investor 
                                                     
116 “Announcement on Changes in the Areas for Petroleum Exploration”, issued by Energy Minister Dr. Uzi Landau on 17 
June 2012 under Article 5 of the Petroleum Law, 1952. The decision closed all of Israel’s offshore areas for new oil and 
gas exploration, except for existing concessions and rights. 
117 The time was used in order to formulate new regulations under the Petroleum Law on the procedures for the award of new 
exploration licenses. The Petroleum Regulations (Principles of Operation for Offshore Petroleum Exploration and 
Production) 5777-2016 were published on November 15, 2016, followed by the launching of a new round of bids for the 
offshore licenses performed according to the new procedures. 
118 The State Comptroller of Israel, The Development of the Natural Gas Market (Jerusalem, June 2015), p. 24. 
119 See “Sara and Myra”, at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sara_and_Myra . 
120 According to information included in the Israeli company Modiin Energy’s 2013 Annual Report, p. 171, based on NSAI 
seismic analysis, the Sara license area had an estimated 20 BCM of gas in two deeper strata, with a 20-30% likelihood, and 
the Myra license had an estimated 64 million barrels of oil at a deeper strata, with a 16% likelihood . 
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or a foreign operator to join the project, more drills could have been undertaken with significant 
investments involved. One should also mention the failed attempt to sell 25% of the Leviathan gas field 
to Woodside Petroleum Ltd., Australia’s second-biggest oil and gas producer, for $2.6 billion. The 
negotiations started in early 2013, but according to press-reports dragged on for over 17 months “amid 
concerns over possible changes in Israeli tax and regulatory policies”.121 Eventually the talks failed and 
the deal was cancelled. In order to raise the huge amount of $5-6 billion required to develop Leviathan, 
the Delek-Noble Partnership needed to sell part of the field or to conclude long-term export contracts 
that could serve as collaterals for lenders. However, given the regulatory uncertainty and the restrictions 
on exports, this became a very difficult task. 
The frustration with the lack of foreign investment in the gas sector was expressed by the Director-
General of the Prime Minister’s Office in December 2015:122  
There have been a few discoveries of gas in the last few years, in Egypt, Cyprus and Israel. Where 
isn’t there a queue of investors that want to invest? In Israel. 
Furthermore, in the Annual Budget Proposal for 2017-2018, in the section where the Government 
informs the Knesset about developments in the natural gas sector, it stated:123 
Exploration for natural gas in the Mediterranean territories that are within Israel’s economic zone 
ceased in 2015 due to the uncertainty in the sector. In view of the approval of the Gas Framework in 
2015, there is now new activity in the sector. 
Apart from the frequent changes in the regulatory setting, one should also mention the “anti-tycoon” 
atmosphere that has evolved over the last few years,124 along with a very strong anti-establishment civil 
society fighting for what it believes are the “people’s rights”.125 As we have seen, this fighting, both on 
the streets, in the media and in the courts, have been at least partly successful, often at the expense of 
the investors. This may also serve to scare off some investors. 
Another point that one needs to remember when assessing the impact of the regulatory instability on 
FDI flows, is that Israel operates in a competitive world. Even with the large discoveries of the last few 
                                                     
121 James Paton, “Woodside Scraps $2.6 Billion Israeli Gas Deal as Talks Fail”, Bloomberg (May 21, 2014), available at: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-05-20/woodside-scraps-2-6-billion-leviathan-gas-deal-after-talks-fail  
122 Protocol of symposium held at the Globes Conference for Business in Israel, on December 7, 2015 (Hebrew, author’s 
translation), available here: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001086552 . At the same symposium the 
Director-General of the Finance Ministry, Shai Babad, also said in relation to the negotiations with Noble Energy: “Usually 
there are more players in line who want to present a counter offer. We did not see any of those” (ibid.). 
123 Annual Budget Proposal for 2017-2018, supra note 46, at p. 24. (The author’s translation). 
124 “Business in Israel: Turning against the tycoons”, The Economist (September 14, 2013), available here: 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21586330-some-israels-leading-businessmen-are-suffering-backlash-turning-
against-tycoons .  
125 Several NGOs were involved in the protest against the Gas Framework, as well as in earlier protests against the Sheshinski 
and Zemach reports. These included: “Anu”, an organization for social activism in Israel 
(http://www.anu.org.il/who_we_are_eng/); “The Social Guard”, an NGO committed to monitoring the government and the 
politicians and fighting for social rights (http://hamishmar.org.il/about-us-2/ourmissio/); “The Israeli Forum for Energy”, 
an advocacy group committed “to secure a sustainable energy future for Israel” (http://www.energia.org.il/english); “The 
Legal Forum for Israel”, an NGO acting to defend by legal means the national interests of Israel 
(http://www.haforum.org/about-us/) ; “The Association for a Sustainable Economy”, an NGO working to promote 
sustainability in Israel’s economy (http://www.ecoeco.org.il/); and “Green Course”, “a grassroots activist organization that 
works to influence decision makers in Israel to create public sustainable environmental and social policy” 
(https://www.green.org.il/en/mission/. All of these groups were organized under an umbrella framework called “The Gas 
Struggle Front”, which coordinated the struggle of all of these NGOs against the Gas Framework, and organized 
demonstrations and public protests (http://www.gas4israel.org/). These demonstrations mobilized thousands of 
demonstrators all over Israel, which were also joined by several Members of the Knesset, mainly from the opposition. See 
for instance, Ynet Reporters, “Thousands across Israel demonstrate against the Gas Plan” (15.11.15)  
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4725735,00.html 
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years, the combined reserves of the Tamar and Leviathan gas fields represent only around 0.4% of the 
world’s total natural gas reserves, and the expected combined annual production from these fields is 
only 0.1% of global annual production.126 Hence, Israel needs to maintain an investment climate that is 
competitive with other gas producing countries.127  
What can be done? Reassessment of Israel’s foreign investment policy in light of recent 
developments 
The developments described in the previous sections require a reassessment of Israel’s investment 
policies. The natural gas discoveries could be a complete game-changer for the future of the country, 
both economically and geopolitically. From an economic perspective, they are expected to free the 
country from an almost 100% dependency on imports for its energy supply, while also opening up new 
lucrative sources of income from taxes and exports. The Knesset has by law set up a special sovereign 
wealth fund, named “The Fund for the Citizens of Israel”, for all of the State’s income from natural gas 
and oil taxes, in order to ensure that the public will gain maximum benefit from the gas finds.128 The 
fund is meant to be a long-term wealth fund whose earnings can be used only for certain social, 
educational and economic purposes, as will be approved by a special public committee.129 From a 
geopolitical perspective, the gas discoveries may establish the basis for future political agreements that 
can influence the stability of the region and create conditions for cooperation between former 
adversaries.130 Such cooperation may have the type of positive spillover effects that classic liberals and 
functionalists have been talking about.131 However, for that to happen, huge investments of previously 
unprecedented magnitudes need to be made in the development of the Leviathan, Tanin and Karish gas 
fields and in laying of pipelines from them to the Israeli coast and to potential export destinations. The 
regulatory instability displayed in Israel since the gas was discovered has delivered a serious blow to 
the country’s image as a reliable investor-friendly economy. When you add that to the serious security 
problems and frequent wars, military engagements and terror attacks that the country has experienced 
ever since its birth in 1948, one can understand why foreign investors may be hesitant to make huge 
long-term investments in its natural resource sector. The Israeli Government understands that. That is 
why in its recently published Offshore Bid Round Launch the Government tries to relieve the expected 
                                                     
126 The proven reserves of Israel are estimated at 835 BCM, and a more optimistic estimate of the reasonable reserves sets them 
at 955 BCM. The estimates of the world’s total reserves are 206,400 trillion metric cubes. Hence, Israel’s reserves are 
around 0.43% of the total. See “Natural Gas in Israel”, at https://ecowiki.org.il/wiki/%D7%92%D7 
%96_%D7%98%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%99_%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%9C . 
127 See also Uri Redler, “Crime and Punishment: The Social Protests Chase Away Investors”, Mida (9.12.2015) (Hebrew), 
available here: http://mida.org.il/2015/12/09/%D7%94%D7%97%D7%98%D7%90-%D7%95%D7%A2%D7%95%D7% 
A0%D7%A9%D7%95-%D7%94%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%90%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%97%D7%91%D7%
A8%D7%AA%D7%99%D7%95%D74AA-%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA-%D7
%90/  
128 The Fund for the Citizens of Israel Law, 5774-2014, passed by the Knesset on July 14, 2014. 
129 Ibid., Article 38(b) and Article 39. The Committee’s mandate is to propose a detailed plan for the use of the annual earnings 
of the fund in accordance with the Government’s proposal. 
130 Already at this stage we know of several letters of understanding that have been signed between the Israeli concessionaires 
(or their foreign partners) and Egyptian, Jordanian and Palestinian buyers that hopefully will lead to the signature of long-
term supply contracts. See, for instance, “Israel will sell gas to Jordan for more than $15 billion”, Globes 3.9.2014 
(Hebrew), available at: http://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1000968817 .  
131 Classic liberal thinkers such as Eméric Crucé in the 17th century and Adam Smith and Thomas Paine in the 18th century 
argued that free trade and economic interdependence promoted peaceful relations. See e.g. John R. Oneal and Bruce M. 
Russet, “The Classical Liberals were Right: Democracy, Interdependence and Conflict 1950-1985”, International Studies 
Quarterly (1997) 41 267-294, at 268; and S.W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 24:55–78 
(1980). For the functionalist approach, see David Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional 
Development of International Organization (Oxford University Press, 1943); Ernst B. Haas, “International Integration: The 
European and the Universal Process”, 15 International Organization 366 (1961).  
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apprehensions of potential foreign investors by making the following statement: “We are committed to 
provide long-term regulatory stability and favorable environment for investment.”132 However, foreign 
investors will naturally ask themselves what guarantees there are for this promise. 
There are in principle two levels on which the Israeli Government can try to address the situation and 
provide guarantees and incentives to foreign investors. One is the domestic level. Here the Government 
can offer various incentives and benefits to foreign investors, such as tax breaks, subsidies, and improved 
infrastructure,133 hoping that these benefits can somehow offset the costs created by the political risks 
in the country and in the region. However, such benefits are not cheap and come at the expense of the 
taxpayers and of other worthy causes.134 The other level at which the problem may be addressed is the 
international one. The Government can address the legitimate concerns of foreign investors by providing 
them with international, legally binding, guarantees that will minimize the political risks that jeopardize 
their investments. Such guarantees will ensure that the investors will not bear the costs of unreasonable 
or discriminatory acts of the host government or of broken commitments. They are likely to alleviate 
concerns and help to restore the trust of potential foreign investors in the energy sector. And as long as 
the government does not act in violation of its international commitments, such tools are considerably 
less expensive than subsidies, tax breaks and other financial incentives bestowed by governments upon 
foreign investors.  
Do BITs in fact help to attract foreign investment? This is a question that is hotly debated in the empirical 
literature.135 Some studies point to little or no effect.136 A study conducted by Mary Hallward-Driemeier, 
for instance, finds only some correlation between the number of BITs a developing country has in force 
and the amount of FDI it receives.137 However, according to her findings, the correlation is stronger for 
countries with strong domestic institutions, such as Israel. 
Several other studies do find positive correlation between BITs and FDI. Neumayer and Spess, for 
instance, in a study in 2005, found a strong effect of BITs on FDI inflows.138 They conclude:  
The message to developing countries therefore is that succumbing to the obligations of BITs does 
have the desired payoff of higher FDI inflows … BITs fulfill their purpose, and those developing 
                                                     
132 “Searching for Oil & Gas in Israel, 1st Offshore Bid Round” published on November  http://www.energy-sea.gov.il/English-
Site/Pages/HomePage.aspx  
133 Indeed, the Government is now considering to grant various incentives to developers of small and medium-sized gas fields 
(see Press Release of the Ministry of Energy of December 13, 2016, in Hebrew: http://energy.gov.il/about the 
Office/SpeakerMessages/Pages/GxmsMniSpokesmanOS2Dec16.aspx ) 
134 Indeed, such investment incentives have been offered at great expense in the past to foreign investors and are still offered 
under the Law for the Encouragement of Capital Investment, 5719-1959. For instance, in 2014, the government granted up 
to $600 million in tax breaks and grants to Intel in return for the company’s commitment to upgrade its computer chips 
production facility in Kiryat Gat. See http://www.timesofisrael.com/intel-to-spend-6b-in-israels-biggest-ever-tech-
investment/ . See also Avi Nov, supra note 13. 
135 Many of the studies have been collected and published in a collection edited by Karl Sauvant and Lisa Sachs: The Effect of 
Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows 
(Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa Sachs, eds.), (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
136 See Emma Aisbet, “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Correlation versus Causation” in The 
Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment 
Flows (Karl P. Sauvant & Lisa Sachs, eds.), (Oxford University Press, 2009) 395-437; and Lauge N.S. Poulsen, “The 
Importance of BITs for Foreign Direct Investment and Political Risk Insurance: Revisiting the Evidence” Yearbook on 
International Investment Law and Policy 2009/2010 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 539-574, available 
here: http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1471858/1/Poulsen_bits%20pri%20yearbook.pdf. These are two of the less supportive 
studies. 
137 Mary Hallward-Driemeier, "Do Bilateral Investment Treaties attract FDI? Only a Bit… and They Could Bite", 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636541 .  
138 Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, “Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct Investment to Developing 
Countries?” 33 World Development 1567 (2005). 
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countries that have signed more BITs with major capital exporting developed countries are likely to 
have received more FDI in return. 
Another study undertaken by the UN Commission on Trade and Development in 1998, found that BITs 
“have a consistently positive if somewhat marginal statistical (90%–95% significance levels) impact in 
the time-series study”, and that this “certainly implies that BITs do play a quantifiably positive role in 
promoting investment.”139 
Salacuse and Sullivan found that US BITs are more likely to induce FDI inflows than those concluded 
by other OECD countries, and that a host country with a US BIT is more likely to increase its overall 
FDI (from all OECD countries) than a country without a US BIT, holding other factors equal.140 This 
finding was confirmed in another study by Yoram Haftel, whose research shows that mutually ratified 
BITs between the US and developing countries increase FDI inflows into those countries, because they 
operate as a costly signal of pro-investment climate and as a credible commitment to an irreversible 
protection of foreign investment.141 Both of these studies would suggest that Israel could benefit 
considerably from concluding a BIT with the US. 
Thus, I believe it is time to reconsider the use of investment treaties as a tool to attract foreign investment 
to Israel. The belief that FDI will flow to here in abundance, in particular to the energy sector, without 
any international guarantees is not sustainable anymore, in view of what has happened. It is in the 
country’s interest that for each investment opportunity, several, not one, foreign investor should 
compete. Moreover, the view that to sign investment treaties with developed countries is a bad signal to 
international markets, is incorrect and outdated. Ever since NAFTA with its extensive investment 
chapter was signed in 1992, and in particular during the last few years, we are seeing more and more 
BITs or comprehensive trade and investment agreements negotiated and signed between developed 
countries.142 In an era where Canadian and Australian investors in the United States are protected by an 
international treaty (NAFTA and the US-Australia FTA143, respectively) and vice versa; and at a time 
when such a treaty with an advanced investment-protection chapter was recently signed and ratified 
                                                     
139 As summarized in Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, “Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and their Grand Bargain”, Sauvant and Sachs, supra note 135, p. 146 
140 ibid., p. 147-148. 
141 Yoram Z. Haftel, “Ratification Counts: US Investment Treaties and FDI Flows into Developing Countries”, Review of 
International Political Economy 17:2, 348-377 (2010). Haftel also provides a partial explanation to some of the less 
supportive findings by showing that only ratified treaties have a positive impact on FDI flows into developing countries, 
and not signed treaties that have not yet entered into force. Hence, studies (such as the 1998 UNCTAD study cited above) 
which count all treaties, including unratified ones, receive inaccurate results. 
142 The two most famous agreements of this kind are the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The TPP was signed in February 2016 between 12 of the Pacific Rim countries, including 
the developed countries Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and the USA, and it contains an investment 
chapter with ISDS. The agreement is awaiting ratification, but now it seems unlikely that the USA will ratify it given the 
election of President Donald Trump who has vowed to withdraw from the agreement. However, Japan has already ratified, 
and other signatories may decide to follow. The TTIP is a proposed agreement between the USA and the EU, which has 
been negotiated since 2013 and also has a comprehensive and innovative investment chapter. If approved, this mega-
agreement would cover the world’s two largest economies and cross-border investments totaling over $3,300 billion, 
several times more than any other agreement to date.  However, negotiations are not expected to finish before 2019 or 
2020, and it remains to be seen if the agreement can be finalized and ratified, given the fierce opposition it arouses in some 
circles. There are also several other so-called North-North agreements, some of which are mentioned and discussed in the 
next footnote. 
143 See Chapter 11 of the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement of 2005, available here: http://dfat.gov.au/about-
us/publications/trade-investment/australia-united-states-free-trade-agreement/Pages/chapter-eleven-investment.aspx . It 
should be noted, however, that while this agreement provides comprehensive protection for investment, both pre- and post-
establishment, it does not include an ISDS provision. One could also mention the Japan-Korea BIT of 2002, which also 
provides both pre- and post-establishment protections, and does have an ISDS mechanism.  
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between the European Union and Canada,144 and another one between the EU and Singapore145 awaits 
final approval, the view that such treaties are only appropriate in North-South relations is clearly 
obsolete. 
In order for such treaties to be effective in attracting foreign investment, one needs to sign them with 
capital-exporting countries. Such treaties can have general application to all sectors, such as in most 
BITs, or they can be limited to the energy sector, as with the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). In fact, the 
ECT offers many other benefits to Israel’s emerging energy sector, in addition to investment protection, 
that are worth considering, such as market access and freedom of transit. Indeed, one needs to consider 
whether perhaps the problems described in length above are peculiar to the energy sector, and therefore 
an investment agreement focused on the energy sector, such as the ECT, may suffice. Another 
worthwhile option for Israel is to negotiate comprehensive trade and investment agreements with the 
economic powers in Asia, such as China, India, Japan and Australia. Such agreements are likely to boost 
both our trade with these countries and to help to attract the capital needed in order to explore and 
discover more of the gas and oil reserves that are hiding in the sea.  
Indeed, we may be seeing a beginning of a reconsideration of Israel’s investment policy, in the 
Government’s recent decision to negotiate a comprehensive bilateral investment agreement with 
Japan.146 If these negotiations are concluded successfully, this will mark Israel’s first modern BIT with 
a developed country. It remains to be seen whether this is a one-time event or reflects a systematic 
change of policy as recommended in this article. 
  
                                                     
144 The European Union-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) was adopted by the EU Council 
and signed at the EU-Canada summit on October 30, 2016. It includes a comprehensive investment protection chapter, with 
both pre- and post-establishment protection, and with Investor-State dispute settlement provisions, including a permanent 
dispute settlement tribunal and an appeal mechanism.  
145 The EU and Singapore completed the negotiations for a comprehensive free trade agreement on 17 October 2014 and it is 
now awaiting final approval by the EU institutions. It includes a comprehensive investment chapter (Chapter 9) including 
ISDS. It should be noted that Singapore has a GDP per capita almost twice as high as Israel. 
146 Government Decision No. 2395, 4.1.2015, para. 3, available here: http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDec 
isions/2015/Pages/dec2395.aspx . It should be noted that the decision to negotiate this new BIT does not seem to be part of 
a systemic change in Israel’s international investment treaty policy, but rather part of a targeted effort at strengthening the 
economic ties with Japan, following PM Netanyahu’s official visit there in May 2014. Indeed, the heading of the decision 
is “Strengthening the Economic Relations and Cooperation with Japan”, and the BIT negotiation is only one of a long list 
of suggested cooperation projects included in the Government’s decision. On the comprehensive nature of the proposed 
BIT one can learn from the more recent Government Decision No. 1437, 4.5.2016, available here: 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/Secretary/GovDecisions/2016/Pages/dec1437.aspx . This decision, that probably reflects a more 
advanced stage of the negotiations with Japan, was taken in order to prepare the ministries and other government entities 
for the upcoming BIT and receive their input for the negotiations. It informs them that the BIT is going to include 
obligations to provide non-discriminatory treatment to Japanese investors and investments in all fields of economic activity. 
It will prohibit the imposition of performance requirements on such investors in relation to their investments or related 
activities, or restrictions on the composition of the management or Board of Directors of a corporation that is an 
“investment” under the BIT, except for as will be provided in the treaty. The non-discrimination obligations will apply to 
all stages of the investment, both in the pre- and post-investment stages. 
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Annex 1 
 
Israel’s Bilateral Investment Treaties147 
 
                                                     
147 The list has been compiled based on several web-based sources and based on information obtained from Israeli Government 
officials. The official sources are: The UNCTAD International Investment Agreements Navigator: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/102#iiaInnerMenu ; Israel’s Ministry of Finance, Chief 
Economists Office, List of Bilateral Investment Agreements: http://www.mof.gov.il/ChiefEcon/ 
InternationalConnections/Pages/BIT.aspx?WPID=WPQ12&PN=1&ptoken=1420161317100 ; Israel’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Database of Bilateral Treaties: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutTheMinistry/LegalTreaties/Pages/Bilateral-
Treaties.aspx  
148 The Agreement is in force for a period of 10 years. Thereafter it shall continue in force until the Expiration of 12 months 
from the date on which either contracting party shall have given written notice of Termination to the other. In respect of 
investments made while this agreement in force, its provisions shall continue in effect with respect to such investments for 
a period of 10 years after the date of termination and without prejudice to the application thereafter of the rules of general 
international law.  
Contracting 
Party 
Full title of the agreement 
Date of 
signature 
Status Expiration Date 
Albania The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
29.1.1996 In force since 
18.2.1997. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after 
termination148 
Argentina The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
23.7.1995 In force since 
10.04.1997. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Armenia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
19.1.2000 In force since 
25.6.2003.  
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Azerbaijan The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
20.2.2007 In force since 
16.1.2009. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Belarus The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
11.4.2000 In force since 
14.08.2003. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Bulgaria The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
6.12.1993 In force since 
17.12.1999. 
Amended. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Bulgaria Amending Protocol 7.7.2011   
China The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
10.4.1995 In force since 
13.1.2009. 
5 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Colombia Free Trade Agreement between Israel 
and Colombia (Chapter 10 – 
Investments) 
30.9.2013 Signed – Not 
Ratified 
 
Congo The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
14.5.1985 Signed – Not 
Ratified 
 
Croatia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
1.8.2000 In force since 
18.3.2013 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Croatia Additional Protocol between the 
Government of the Republic of 
Croatia and the Government of the 
State of Israel on Amendments to the 
30.3.2011 Signed – Not 
Ratified 
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149 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.C_.2016.149.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:C:2016:149:T 
OC. According to information obtained by the present author from Israel’s Ministry of Finance, the status of the treaty is 
in dispute between the parties: Israel is of the opinion that it has expired, while France maintains that it is still in force.   
150 Article 1(c)(ii) provides that the term “investment” shall refer: “in respect of investments in the territory of the State of 
Israel, to all investments admitted by Israel by a document of admission.” The meaning of such a document is elaborated 
in the Protocol to the agreement, which in Ad Article 1(a), provides: “The expression 'document of admission' shall mean 
a document by which the State of Israel admits into its territory for the purposes of the Treaty an investment by a national 
or company of the Federal Republic of Germany.” (emphasis added – A.R.). In other words, the Israeli authorities must 
Agreement between the Government 
of the Republic of Croatia and the 
Government of the State of Israel for 
the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
Cyprus The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
13.10.1998 In force since 
17.6.2003 
 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Czech Republic The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
23.9.1997 In force since 
16.3.1999 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
El Salvador The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
3.4.2000 In force since 
7.7.2003 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Estonia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
14.3.1994 In force since 
23.5.1995 
 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Ethiopia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
26.11.2003 In force since 
22.3.2004 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
France Accord entre le Gouvernement de la 
République française et le 
Gouvernement de l'Etat d'Israël sur 
l'encouragement et la protection 
réciproques des investissements 
9.6.1983 In force since 
11.1.1985 
According to Israel’s 
MOF, expired in 1995, 
but continued to apply 
for another 20 years to 
investments made 
before that date. Not 
listed under Israel’s list, 
but France maintains 
that it is still in force 
and has notified it as 
such to the EU 
Commission.149  
Georgia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
19.6.1995 In force since 
18.2.1997 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Germany The Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment 
24.6.1976 In force since 
14.4.1980. 
According to 
MOJ, had only 
temporary 
effect. But 
notified by 
Germany to EU 
Commission. In 
Israel applies 
only to 
approved 
investments.150 
Unlimited time. 
Need one year notice 
before termination 
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have issued such a document, which in effect acknowledges that the investment will be subject to the BIT, in order for the 
BIT to apply to it. In contrast, for Israeli investments in Germany, there is no such formal requirement. Rather, the definition 
is: “in respect of investments in the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, to all investments made in accordance 
with its legislation” 
Guatemala The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
7.11.2006 In force since 
15.1.2009 
 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Hungary The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
14.5.1991 In force since 
14.9.1992, but 
treaty 
terminated on 
26.6.2007; 
existing 
investments are 
protected for ten 
years after 
termination. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
India The Promotion and Protection of 
Investments 
29.1.1996 In force since 
2.1997 
Unlimited time unless a 
contracting party gives 
one-year notice 
Kazakhstan The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
27.12.1995 In force since 
19.2.1997 
 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Korea The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Including 
Protocol Ad Article 6 
7.2.1999 In force since 
19.6.2003. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Latvia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
27.2.1994 In force since 
9.5.1995. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Lithuania The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
2.10.1994 In force since 
11.7.1996. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Moldova The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
22.6.1997 In force since 
16.3.1999. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Mongolia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
25.11.2003 In force since 
2.9.2004 
(UNCTAD) or 
since 13.2.2006 
(Israel MOF) 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Montenegro The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
28.7.2004  
(with Serbia) 
In force since 
7.2.2006 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Myanmar The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
5.10.2014 Signed – Not yet 
Ratified 
 
Poland The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
22.5.1991 In force since 
6.5.1992. 
Amended. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 20 
years after termination 
Poland Protocol between the Government of 
the Republic of Poland and the 
Government of the State of Israel to 
Amend the Agreement for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection 
of Investments 
27.6.1997   
Israel’s foreign investment protection regime in view of developments in its energy sector 
European University Institute 29 
 
                                                     
151 In the UNCTAD database this treaty is listed erroneously as “terminated”. The present author has obtained information 
from Israel’s Ministry of Finance (Mr. Boaz Fleischman-Alaluf, Chief Economist’s Office, in charge of BITs), according 
to which this is a result of a mistaken notification by Israel to UNCTAD, and that in fact, the treaty is still in force. 
Romania Summary Record of the Negotiations 
Concerning An Agreement for The 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection 
of Investment 
5.6.1997 In force since 
27.7.2003. 
Amended. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Romania Amending Protocol 12.8.2010   
Serbia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
28.7.2004  
(with Montenegro) 
In force since 
7.2.2006 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Slovakia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
8.9.1999 In force since 
24.6.2003. 
10 years and shall 
continue until either 
contracting party 
notifies the other. 10 
years after termination 
Slovenia The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
13.5.1998 In force since 
2.10.1999.151 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
South Africa The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
20.10.2004 
 
Signed – Not 
Ratified: 
Pending 
ratification by 
South Africa, 
Israel ratified 
agreement on 
March 30, 2009 
 
Thailand The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
18.02.2000 In force since 
28.08.2003 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Turkey The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
14.3.1996 In force since 
27.8.1998. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Turkmenistan The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
24.5.1995 In force since 
17.3.1997. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Ukraine The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
24.11.2010 In force since 
18.2.1997. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Uruguay The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
30.3.1998 In force since 
7.10.2004. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
Uzbekistan The Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 
4.7.1994 In force since 
18.2.1997. 
10 years + 12 month 
from Termination. 10 
years after termination 
  
 
